Items tagged with: could
HN Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19712705
Posted by ToBeBannedSoon (karma: 190)
Post stats: Points: 339 - Comments: 250 - 2019-04-21T16:07:06Z
#HackerNews #12t #cancel #co2 #could #decade #emissions #out #planting #trees
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HN Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19666442
Posted by pseudolus (karma: 18311)
Post stats: Points: 175 - Comments: 42 - 2019-04-15T16:16:40Z
#HackerNews #could #for #hackers #hotmail #months #non-corporate #outlookcom #read #six
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© Danny Moerkerke
HN Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19640226
Posted by technojunkie (karma: 231)
Post stats: Points: 132 - Comments: 57 - 2019-04-11T23:09:34Z
#HackerNews #components #could #frameworks #frontend #replace #web
© Danny Moerkerke
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Op-Med ran the “First Stab” contest in February 2019. We are excited to announce this as the runner-up.
Article word count: 918
HN Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19597239
Posted by bookofjoe (karma: 5882)
Post stats: Points: 245 - Comments: 91 - 2019-04-07T15:10:39Z
#HackerNews #could #did #everything #lied #said #when
Op-Med ran the “First Stab” contest in February 2019. We are excited to announce this as the runner-up.
I knew it was only a matter of time until a code would be called during my intern ICU rotation. I knew it would leave a lasting impression on me, regardless of the particular circumstances. What I didn’t know was exactly how and when it would do so.
She was young — late thirties, I think — and had spent most of the past year in the hospital. The unlucky victim of genetics and circumstances still not understood by science, she was dying from sarcoidosis. She had long been beyond any hope of meaningful recovery.
I had not been taking care of her, but I remembered my attending describing her case with a regrettable helplessness. He had spoken with her family innumerable times explaining her dismal prognosis, the virtues of palliation and hospice care, and the harms of overtreatment. Like many families, anything other than a “full code” meant giving up on their loved one. In the midst of tragedy, changing that mindset, like the code itself, was often an exercise in futility.
As my attending and I jogged to her room for the code, this defeat was written all over his face. He already felt he had failed this patient, and now, as the ultimate price to pay for his failure, he had to run the code. And I was his accomplice in harm.
With adrenaline coursing through my veins, I was amazed at how easy it was to depress the chest wall. I pushed aside my reservations and concentrated on form and rate. My attending called out orders as I rotated through cycles of compressions with two others. Suddenly, in the midst of my second or third cycle, her eyes shot open and locked on mine. I jumped back in surprise as she made a few agonizing attempts for breath, tensing her body in apparent attempt to sit up. Within seconds, her eyes rolled to the back of her head and she again went limp.
The call to resume compressions came. I felt a few ribs pop under my hands. She showed no further sign of life. After about thirty-five minutes, the attending called it.
In the time it took to run the code, a family member had arrived and was waiting in a conference room for us. Much to my surprise, my attending didn’t come right out and tell the man his loved one had died. Instead, he described every detail of the code, including the brief moment we “got her back,” before eventually concluding with her death. Equally surprising, the man sat, wordless, through the entire description. I imagined what kind of roller coaster this conversation must have and wondered if it was a harsh or gentle way to break it to him.
Even as I empathized with him, I found myself judging him. Why had he done that to her? Was he glad she spent the last months of her life in the hospital, barely aware of her surroundings other than her struggle to breathe? Was he glad the last thing she saw was me, a stranger, pounding away at her chest? Did he really believe all the prolonged suffering was worth it? Would he do it all again? The year in the hospital? The anoxic brain injuries? The ventilator-associated pneumonia? The bedsores?
Hours later, as I was making the long trek out of the hospital to the parking deck, mulling over my involvement in the code, I met her loved one in the hallway. I didn’t recognize him immediately, too caught up in my own thoughts. After walking side-by-side for a few seconds, he spoke.
“You were in there, weren’t you?” he asked me.
“Yes, I was.”
“You all did everything you could, didn’t you?” he asked hopefully.
I wanted to tell him no. I wanted to tell him that if we had done everything we could she would have gone to the palliative unit or home on hospice. We could have let her go peacefully. Instead, she died in a room full of strangers assaulting her body. I wanted to tell him about the look of agony in her eyes when she opened them the final time. I wanted him to feel the ribs popping, hear the gurgling as she struggled with her last breath. I wanted him to understand her suffering.
But he couldn’t, and, as I looked into his eyes, I knew I didn’t understand his, either.
I didn’t know what it was like to lose a loved one so young. I didn’t know what conversations about the end of life he had had with the patient. I didn’t know what the goals of care conversations were like he was a part of (judging from some of the ones I’ve seen since, likely not great). I didn’t know what other family dynamics fed into the decisions he had made. I didn’t know how helpless it must have felt in his situation. His only power over her disease was exerted vicariously through the medical care she received.
Most importantly, she was no longer suffering. He was.
“Yes,” I replied, “We did everything we could.”
Tears welled up in his eyes. “Thank you.”
Together, we walked in silence to the parking deck.
J. Lane Wilson is a full-spectrum family physician at the Brody School of Medicine at East Carolina University in Greenville, NC. He is married to another family physician and is the father of two. He enjoys hiking with his family, running, and is a Major League Soccer fanatic.
Illustration by April Brust
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Pilots "repeatedly" tried recommended procedures to prevent the crash of flight ET302, a preliminary report finds.
Article word count: 639
HN Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19570378
Posted by jfk13 (karma: 1013)
Post stats: Points: 99 - Comments: 89 - 2019-04-04T09:05:08Z
#HackerNews #737 #airlines #boeing #could #ethiopian #nosedive #not #pilots #stop
Investigators with the US National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) look over debris at the crash site of Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 302. Image copyright Getty Images
The Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed last month nosedived several times before it hit the ground, a preliminary report has said.
Pilots "repeatedly" followed procedures recommended by Boeing before the crash, according to the first official report into the disaster.
Despite their efforts, pilots "were not able to control the aircraft", Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges said.
Flight ET302 crashed after take-off from Addis Ababa, killing 157 people.
It was the second crash of a Boeing 737 Max aircraft in five months.
Last October, Lion Air flight JT 610 crashed into the sea near Indonesia killing all 189 people on board.
In a news conference in Addis Ababa, Ms Dagmawit said: "The crew performed all the procedures repeatedly [that were] provided by the manufacturer but were not able to control the aircraft."
In a statement, the chief executive of Ethiopian Airlines, Tewolde GebreMariam, said he was "very proud" of the pilotsʼ "high level of professional performance".
"It was very unfortunate they could not recover the airplane from the persistence of nosediving," the airline said in a statement.
The 737 Max family of aircraft was grounded following the Ethiopian Airlines crash, a move affecting more than 300 planes.
Investigators have focused their attention on the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) - software designed to help prevent the 737 Max from stalling.
The software reacts when sensors in the nose of the aircraft show the jet is climbing at too steep an angle, which can cause a plane to stall.
An investigation into the Lion Air flight suggested the system malfunctioned, and forced the planeʼs nose down more than 20 times before it crashed into the sea.
The preliminary report from Indonesian investigators found that a faulty sensor on the aircraft wrongly triggered MCAS without the pilotsʼ knowledge.
Boeing has been working on an upgrade of the MCAS software since the Lion Air crash.
It has said the system can be disabled - allowing pilots to regain control if there appears to be a problem.
But the latest comments from Ethiopian officials suggest that pilots could not regain control, despite following procedures recommended by Boeing.
Analysis: What does the report mean for Boeing?
By Tom Burridge, BBC transport correspondent
Image copyright Getty Images
Image caption Hundreds of 737 Maxs are grounded worldwide
Two crashes, five months apart, with a total of 346 people dead.
Both preliminary crash reports suggest a new design to the 737 Max 8 malfunctioned, pushing each plane repeatedly into a nosedive.
One lawsuit has been filed. More are likely.
The suffering of those whoʼve lost loved ones canʼt be quantified. But the commercial toll for the manufacturer and damage to its reputation, at this stage, canʼt be either.
Hundreds of 737 Maxs are grounded worldwide. Thousands of orders are, for now on ice, and some could even be in jeopardy.
The Max was Boeingʼs answer to Airbusʼ A320: a single-aisle, fuel-efficient short-haul plane.
But in the opinion of one experienced 737 pilot, the new anti-stall system, which was added to the aircraft and contributed to both crashes, was "flawed".
Boeing is working to fix it. It needs to get the aircraft certified as safe and back in the air as soon as it can.
Read more from Tom here.
The preliminary report from Ethiopian authorities did not attribute blame for the crash and did not give detailed analysis of the flight.
But it did suggest that Boeing review the aircraft control system and said aviation authorities should confirm the problem had been solved before allowing the 737 Max back into the air.
Boeing has issued guidance to pilots on how to manage MCAS.
It plans to install an extra warning system on all 737 Max aircraft, which was previously an optional safety feature.
It is also revising pilot training to provide "enhanced understanding of the 737 Max" flight system and crew procedures.
The planemaker says the upgrades are not an admission that MCAS caused the crashes.
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hi, disclaimer: this has not yet been verified by anyone other than myself, so I could very well be wrong. Reproducible builds are about enabling anyone to independently verify that... ;p ==…
HN Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19310638
Posted by JNRowe (karma: 149)
Post stats: Points: 136 - Comments: 60 - 2019-03-05T14:19:32Z
#HackerNews #buster #could #debian #only #reproducible #while #will
hi, disclaimer: this has not yet been verified by anyone other than myself,
so I could very well be wrong. Reproducible builds are about enabling
anyone to independently verify that... ;p == Reproducibility in theory == According to https://tests.reproducible-builds.org/debian/buster/index_suite_amd64_stats.html
we have 26476 source packages (92.8%) which can be built reproducibly in
buster/amd64, out of 28523 source packages in total. (These 28523 source packages build 57448 binary packages.) But these tests are done without looking at the actual .deb files distributed
from ftp.debian.org (and we always knew that and pointed it out: "93% reproducible in our current test framework".) == Looking at binary packages Debian actually distributes == So, Vagrant came up with an idea to check buildinfo.debian.net for
.deb files for which 2 or more .buildinfo exist (where "exist" means
that the .deb files sha1sum is listed in the .buildinfo file) and I
turned that into a jenkins job doing this check for all 57448 binary
packages in amd64/buster/main (incl downloading all those .deb files from
ftp.d.o). The current main results (from this job ) are: reproducible packages in buster/amd64: 30885: (53.7600%)
unreproducible packages in buster/amd64: 26543: (46.2000%) and reproducible binNMUs in buster/amd64: 0: (0%)
unreproducible binNMU in buster/amd64: 7423: (12.9200%) == why are binNMUs unreproducible? == Because of their design, binNMUs are unreproducible, see #894441 for
the details (in short: binNMUs are not what they are ment to be: the source
is changed and thrown away) and our proposed solution: ʼbinNMUs should
be replaced by easy "no-change-except-debian/changelog-uploadsʼ. So that accounts for 12%, but 12% are not enough to explain the
difference between 54% and 93%... == packages which have not been rebuilt since December 2016 == And today I remember a thread I started last year in May, titled
"packages which have not been rebuilt since December 2016" (because
these packages were build with an old dpkg not producing .buildinfo
files, which Chris turned into #900837 "release.debian.org: Mass-rebuild of packages for reproducible builds" and so today I ran
Chrisʼ script again on coccia.d.o, and today it showed that ʼonlyʼ
6804 source packages need a rebuild (compared to 9192 eight months ago). 6804 of of 28523 is 23.9%. And 54%+12%+24% equals 90%. Bingo. Bummer. (While #900837 was only filed in 2018 we knew about this issue since
2015 or so... probably earlier. Sigh.) == After the release is before the release. == So, as we first need to fix #894441 before we can sensibly fix #900837 and
because Buster is practically frozen, I think we can just conclude that
Buster is quite reproducible in theory (similar but better than
Stretch...) and that we need to make sure to address #894441 ASAP, which means for Bullseye, the release after Buster. Fur future reference, a summary of the current status of Debianʼs
reproducibiliy is available at
https://wiki.debian.org/ReproducibleBuilds#Big_outstanding_issues Happy hacking and many many thanks to everyone who has contributed so far! https://lists.reproducible-builds.org/pipermail/rb-general/201😲ctober/001239.html
https://wiki.debian.org/ReproducibleBuilds#Big_outstanding_issues -- tschau, Holger ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- holger@(debian|reproducible-builds|layer-acht).org PGP fingerprint: B8BF 5413 7B09 D35C F026 FE9D 091A B856 069A AA1C
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